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Introduction 
CID is calling from the Post hospital. A drug 
deal gone awry has left the seller in critical 
condition with a bullet lodged in his back. The 
two unidentified male caucasian buyers fled the 
scene with a small packet of heroin. One prob-
ably received a bullet wound from the seller's 
gun as he fled. Shortly afterwards an MP 
patrol stopped a weaving car occupied by two 
male Caucasians matching the description of 
the "buyers". The driver appeared to be intoxi-
cated, the passenger had a bullet wound in his 
shoulder. The MP's effected a lawful appre-
hension, called the CID, and proceeded to the 
hospital. CID wants to know what they must 
do to get the two bullets, a· blood test on the 
driver, and the heroin which is possibly secreted 
in the passenger's rectum. 
Although in its composite form the fore-
going problem is not common, the individual 
questions of lawful seizure and admissibility 
of each piece of evidence do arise with great 
frequency. The answers to the questions raised 
should be examined in the light of three con-
trolling principles which potentially apply in 
any case involving bodily evidence: 
(1) The right against self-incrimination; 
(2) fourth amendment protections; and 
(3) due process considerations. 
This article addresses those principles and the 
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impact of Rule 312, Bodily Views, and Intru-
sions, Military Rules of Evidence1 on their 
application. We turn first to the potential ques-
tion, or principle, of the applicability of the 
right against self-incrimination. 
Self -incrimination Considerations 
Does an individual have a right to refuse to 
present bodily evidence on the rationale that it 
will violate his right against self-incrimination? 
The civilian courts, considering the fifth amend-
ment protection, say, "no." The right only pro-
tects compelled testimonial communications. 
The Supreme Court has for example rejected 
self-incrimination arguments where blood was 
taken from the suspect. 2 However, different 
results may emerge in the military setting 
where a service member gains the broad cov-
erage of Article 31, U.C.M.J. Although a service 
member may not stand behind the right against 
self-incrimination when asked to provide ex-
ternal body evidence such as tatoos, scars, hair, 
and teeth impressions, 3 he may properly invoke 
the right when asked to provide bodily fluids 
such as blood, semen, or urine.4 
If the sought evidence is a foreign object 
located in the body, protection of Article 31 
may be available depending on the manner of 
obtaining it. An order to a suspect to extract 
an object from a body cavity would probably 
be protected under the verbal acts doctrine-
turning over the evidence wo1,1.ld constitute ~n 
incriminating "statement". 5 Letting nature run 
its course or removal by another would more 
than likely avoid the issue of self-incrimina-
tion. 6 Although the law here is always in a 
state of flux, it seems safe to conclude that 
bodily fluids or other internal bodily evidence 
voluntarily submitted by the suspect after 
proper warnings and waiver would overcome 
self-incrimination arguments/ If the evidence 
was obtained under compulsion, then self-
incrimination problems may also fade if the 
individual suffers no criminal consequence.8 
The Military Rules of Evidence do not change 
the military's broader application of the right 
against self-incrimination. Provision is made, 
however, in Rule 305 that right to counsel 
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warnings need be given only when testimonial 
communications are sought.9 
Applying these general principles to the facts 
presented in the introduction, do any of the 
actors have a right to refuse to provide the 
sought evidence on grounds of self-incrimina-
tion? Retrieving the bullets should not present 
a self-incrimination problem. Although the 
wounded seller and wounded passenger are 
suspects and entitled to rights warnings before 
being questioned, 10 compelling them to submit 
to surgical removal, whether major or minor, 
should not raise self-incrimination problems. 
Different results occur, however, with regard 
to the blood sample and the heroin. Simply 
ordering the suspects to provide the evidence 
clearly raises self-incrimination problems. The 
CID may obtain the evidence either through 
voluntary reli11quishment or through compul-
sion accompanied by immunity from use of the 
incriminating evidence.11 
The second potential principle to be addressed 
is application of fourth amendment guidelines. 
Here, the Military Rules of Evidence do spe-
cifically make major changes and may ulti-
mately resolve some of the potential self-
incrimination problems arising in cases where 
bodily evidence is in issue. 
Fourth Amendment Considerations: Rule 312 
Clearly, right to privacy considerations, the 
core of the fourth amendment, are present in 
cases where the government is searching or 
seizing evidence from an inidvidual's person. 
The civilian and military courts in addressing 
the applicability of the fourth amendment gen-
erally apply a sliding scale analysis approach 
to bodily evidence questions. The inquiry cen-
ters on the degree of intrusion. At one end of 
the spectrum lie those cases involving only 
visual examination of the body.12 At the other 
lie surgical intrusions for the purposes of 
obtaining incriminating evidence. Implicit 
throughout the analysis is a balancing of the 
government's and individual's interests.13 
The 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial provi-
sion on bodily evidence was included in the 
~' 
discussion on search and seizure and allowed 
for intrusions under certain circumstances. 14 
Rule 312 of the new rules of evidence specifi-
cally addresses the fourth amendment issues 
and generally follows (as will the next section) 
the sliding-scale tact employed by the courts. 
Visual Examination of the Body: Rule 312(b) 
Under Rule 312(b) visual examination of 
the body may be conducted with the consent 
of the individualY It may be conducted without 
consent if done in a reasonable manner and 
under one of several authorized procedures: 
(I) Inspection or inventory ;16 
(2) Border search or its military equivalent 
if there is a real suspicion that weapons, 
contraband or evidence of a crime are 
concealed on the individual ;17 
(3) Jail search ;18 
( 4) Search incident to apprehension ;19 
( 5) Emergency search ;20 or 
(6) Probable cause search.21 
An authorized involuntary examination of 
the body may include visual examination of 
body cavities. The rule urges use of a member 
of same sex as the individual when conducting 
the examination but failure to do so does not 
render any seized evidence inadmissible.22 The 
rule appears to follow what civilian law exists 
on the subject. The greater amount of litiga-
tion has centered on what are typically char-
acterized as "strip searches" at borders to the 
United States23 or pursuant to prison searches.24 
This rule, however, clearly links nonconsensual 
bodily inspections or viewing with other valid 
searches and thus places paramaters on what 
has proved to be a delicate topic in some civilian 
jurisdictions. So much for the superficial ex-
amination of the body human; actual intrusion 
into a body cavity to retrieve the evidence is 
covered in Rule 312(c). 
Intrusion Into Body Cavities: Rule 312(c) 
Rule 312 (c) separates body cavities into two 
categories. The first category is comprised of 
37 
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the "mouth, nose, and ears." The second in-
cludes "other body cavities." Reasonable non-
consensual physical intrusion into the first 
category is allowed whenever a visual inspection 
of the body is allowed. For example, to seize a 
piece of evidence secreted in the individual's 
mouth, the law enforcement officials must either 
(1) obtain the individual's consent or (2) pro-
ceed under one of the listed authorized searches 
in Rule 312(b)(2).25 
Different rules apply to intrusions into the 
second category of body cavities. Although not 
specifically addressed, consensual intrusions 
apparently require no special consideration 
other than the reasonableness of the intrusion. 26 
Nonconsensual intrusions are further categor-
ized into those involving "seizures" 27 and those 
involving "searches." 28 
A "search" for weapons, contraband, or evi-
dence must be conducted by an individual with 
"appropriate medical qualifications" 29 and 
only after first obtaining authorization under 
Rule 315 which details the requirements for 
a probable cause search.30 A "reasonable" non-
consensual "seizure" of contraband, evidence 
or weapons spotted during a lawful visual in-
spection or pursuant to a "plain view" must be 
conducted by a person with appropriate medical 
qualifications. 31 For example, if law enforce-
ment personnel discover seizable contraband 
in an individual's rectum or vagina during a 
properly conducted visual examination or pur-
suant to a plain view observation, they should 
request the assistance of medical personnel to 
actually extract the contraband. 32 If they have 
not seen but have probable cause to believe 
that the contraband is secreted in the rectum 
or vagina they should proceed to obtain proper 
authorization and then use medical personnel 
to actually conduct the search. Note that the 
rule provides that if the search is being con-
ducted in a jail or similar facility, it may be 
based on "real suspicion that weapons, contra-
band, or evidence are being concealed on the 
individual," and may be conducted without 
prior authorization.33 
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Seizing Bodi!y Fluids: Rule 312( d) 
As in the rule's provision covering intrusion 
into body cavities, no specific provision is made 
in 312 (d) for consensual seizure of bodily fluids. 
Arguably such a voluntary relinquishment of 
fluids would be permiss.ible.34 The rule does 
specifically address nonconsensual seizures of 
bodily fluids such as blood and urine. 
If the seizure is nonconsensual, the authori-
ties must obtain either a search warrant or a 
search authorization. An exception to this re-
quirement may exist if "there is a clear indi-
cation that evidence of crime will be found" 
and delay resulting from obtaining the neces-
sary authorization will result in its destruc-
tion.35 In any seizure of bodily fluids, the ex-
traction must be reasonable and conducted by 
medical personnel. 
Absent from this provision is language ad-
dressing potential self-incrimination questions 
associated with production of bodily fluids. 3" 
The intent of the drafters is apparently cen-
tered on treatment of the issue as primarily a 
search and seizure problem. But as noted ear-
lier, counsel must, in any bodily evidence fact 
pattern, go through an analysis of potential 
self-incrimination applications. Foresight might 
avoid the Article 31 (a) self-incrimination prob-
lems. If the authorities treat the production of 
the fluids as a. fourth amendment problem and 
not simply issue "orders" or requests" to the 
individual for the fluids, they will be in a better 
position to argue the inapplicability of the 
Article 31(a) line of cases touching on bodily 
fluids.37 
Other Intrusive Searches: Rule 312(e) 
If law enforcement officials wish to obtain 
or locate items not in the scope o:f the provi-
sions governing visual examination of the body 
or intrusion into the body cavities, according 
to 312(e) the intrusion must (1) be based upon 
a search warrant or authorization; (2) be 
conducted in a reasonable fashion by medical 
personnel; and (3) not endanger the health of 
the individual being searched. Compelling bod-
ily elimination of the object or forcing ingestion 
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of tracer substances constitutes a search within 
the rule. 38 Simply allowing nature to run fts 
course would apparently not raise any serious 
fourth amendment problems.39 Note that these 
intrusive searches may not be conducted upon 
individuals not suspects or accuseds. 
This portion of the rule should cover those 
situations generally classified in the civilian line 
of cases as surgical intrusions to obtain evi-
dence. Those cases generally apply a balancing 
test of all the interests involved; that is, the 
government's need for the evidence, the indi-
vidual's privacy and health, and the proposed 
procedureS.40 
A judicial template in this area which may 
be helpful is United States v. CrowderY Police, 
anxious to retrieve two bullets (in wrist and 
thigh) from a suspected murderer, sought as-
sistance from a United States Attorney who 
applied for and obtained judicial approval to 
have the evidence surgically removed. The 
application was unsuccessfully opposed by the 
defendant who also unsuccessfully sought a 
writ of prohibition. The bullets were surgically 
removed and later offered into evidence. The 
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia sus-
tained the conviction; the court seemed to be 
impressed with: (1) the fact that the only way 
to get this relevant evidence was through sur-
gical removal; (2) the defendant was offered 
an opportunity to block the application for the 
surgery; (3) he was offered an opportunity for 
appellate review of the order to remove the 
bullets ; and ( 4) the surgery was minor and 
was conducted by skilled doctors who took all 
of the necessary precautions. 
Under Rule 312, judicial authorizations to 
search for or seize bodily evidence are not 
required. But inthe situation where surgical 
intrusions are required, the Crowder procedures 
serve as a good example of a "reasonable" 
surgical intrusion. 
Intrusions for Valid Medical Purposes: Rule 
312(f) 
Serving as a relief valve for any bodily 
evidence issue, whether a mere visual examina-
tion or a surgical intrusion, is the rule's pro-
vision which states: 
Evidence or contraband obtained from 
an examination or intrusion conducted 
for a valid medical purpose may be 
seized and is not evidence obtained 
from an unlawful search or seizure. 
" 42 
Implicit in this is a requirement to examine 
the actual purpose and method of the examina-
tion. Simply labelling a search or seizure as a 
valid medical examination probably will not 
be sufficient. What about taking blood or urine 
samples for the medical purpose of detecting 
drug usage? Again, there may not be a fourth 
amendment problem but Article 31 (a) lingers 
on and must be considered. 43 
Turning briefly to the problem presented in 
the introduction, may the CID properly seize 
the two bullets, the blood sample, and the 
heroin? Yes, on all three counts. Assuming that 
the three suspects refuse to voluntarily provide 
the evidence, the CID have several options but 
the surest method is to proceed under Rule 
312 and obtain a search authorization for each 
item.H That assumes of course that probable 
cause may be established for each requested 
search; if it does not exist, for example, with 
regard to the heroin, other provisions of Rule 
312 might support a visual examination and 
subsequent seizure under 312(b) 45 or 312(f).46 
Due Process Considerations 
The third and final consideration in the area 
of bodily evidence is the pervasive theme of 
"due process". This is especially important in 
bodily evidence questions where the individual's 
right to be secure in his or her person is para-
mount. Courts are forever sensitive to the 
Rochin "shock the conscience" test47 and the 
possibility that the invasion, however, slight! 
might constitute an unwarranted violation of 
one's dignity and privacy. 
Rule 312 senses the delicate and personal 
nature of bodily evidence questions and so re-
quires "reasonable" execution of the search or 
39 
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the seizure and in some instances mandates 
that medical personnel effect the seizure. The 
rule certainly does not abrogate any due process 
questions; a properly authorized intrusion may 
nonetheless be prohibited on due process 
grounds. For example, the authorities may have 
proper authorization to seize drugs secreted in 
a body cavity but in effecting the seizure "shock 
the conscience" in the manner in which they 
retrieve the contraband.48 
Conclusion 
Rule 312 makes a bold step in the law of 
bodily evidence. For the first time in military 
practice, many of the bodily evidence rules are 
now codified. Codification notwithstanding, the 
important issues of self-incrimination and due 
process remain open and must be considered in 
conjunction with the fourth amendment issues 
in Rule 312. Treating the bodily evidence prob-
lem as a fourth amendment issue from the 
outset and using extreme care in executing the 
searches or seizures will probably avoid both 
the self-incrimination and due process issues. 
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See notes 47, 48 infra, and accompanying text. 
"Key here would be an analysis of the facts to deter-
mine if the evidence was obtained by a lawful search 
or seizure or by an "interrogation." See note 25 
supra. 
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43 Mo. L. Rev. 133 (1978). 
42 Mil. R. Evid. 312(f). See United States v. Miller, 15 
C.M.A. 320, 35 C.M.R. 292 (1965) where court al-
lowed evidence of alcohol content in blood taken from 
unconscious suspect for purely diagnostic purposes. 
Absent was any "nexus" between the doctor and en-
forcement agents or the suspect's superiors who may 
have been interested in the results. 
43 This is particularly true where the "diagnostic" 
sample is being taken from a "suspect" at the request 
of law enforcement officers. If a random sampling 
program is underway and the individual is not a 
suspect, then fewer problems exist. If during the 
testing, an individual indicates that the test will turn 
out positive, he becomes a suspect and the Ruiz 
problem looms. 
"See e.g., 312(b) (2) (involuntaTy visual inspection of 
body, including body cavities, pursuant to probable 
cause search); Rule 312(c) (2) (nonconsensual search 
of rectum based upon probable cause). 
•• The visual, nonconsensual, inspection of the body 
would of have to based upon one of the stated pro-
cedures in Rule 312(b). See notes 16-21, supra and 
accompanying text. 
"For example, even as the CID agent is speaking, 
medical personnel concerned over the medical well-
being of the suspects may be taking blood samples 
and giving them valid medical examinations. 
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"Rochin v, California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
"For example, in People v. Scott, 23 CrL 2253 (June 
21, 1978) the California Supreme court balanced the 
interests of the Government and the suspect and con-
sidered the general nature of the intrusion. It con-
cluded that a court-ordered bodily intrusion, which 
consisted of the suspect's prostrate gland being mas-
42 
saged in order to obtain a semen sample, was as 
extreme as the regurgitation in Rochin. But in Dar-
land v. State, 25 CrL. 2377 (Aug 1, 1979) the court 
found no due process violation where a police officer 
obtained a urine sample from a DWI suspect by 
holding a styrofoam cup in front of him while he was 
urinating. 
Eyewitness Identification Under The Military Rules of Evidence 
CPT(P) Richard H. Gasperini 
Criminal Law Division, T J AGSA 
The issue of eyewitness identification has 
always included two components: right to coun-
sel and due process. Prior to adoption of the 
Military Rules of Evidence1 the military prac-
titioner had no single source of authority per-
taining to these two diverse concepts; this void 
has now been filled by rule 321.2 Additionally, 
the rule sets out significant procedural changes 
with regard to the admission of identification 
evidence. 
Introduction of Eyewitness Testimony 
Under the hearsay definition encompassed in 
former Manual Paragraph 139a, in-court refer-
ence to extrajudicial declarations of identity 
were considered to be hearsay and therefore 
generally inadmissible. 3 To qualify for admis-
sion such out-of-court identifications had to fall 
under either a recognized hearsay exception• 
or come within the special bolstering provisions 
of Paragraph 153a, MCM. That paragraph 
permitted the admission of such evidence for 
the limited purpose of corroborating courtroom 
testimony, provided the witness first made an 
in-court identification of the accused.5 
Under the Military Rules of Evidence testi-
mony concerning an out-of-court identification 
remains, as a general rule, hearsay. 6 Admission 
of such evidence must therefore be based on a 
recognized hearsay exception listed in rules 
8037 or 8048 or some other evidentiary provi-
sion. 
The Military rules have in rule 801(d) (1) 
(C)9 adopted a provision which significantly 
expands the opportunity to introduce eyewit-
ness testimony.10 It provides that a statement of 
identification, whether given in court or out of 
court, is not hearsay when the identifying wit-
ness is present in curt and subject to cross-
examination.11 Under this rule an eyewitness 
may refer to an extrajudicial identification 
even though that identification does not qualify 
as a traditional hearsay exception and notwith-
standing the fact that an in-court identification 
is not first made. 
The second sentence of rule 32112 is the vehicle 
for introducing most evidence admissible under 
rule 801. It provides that a person making an 
out-of-court identification, as well as anyone 
observing it, may testify concerning that mat-
ter. This provision is applicable to those situa-
tions where a victim, or any eyewitness, identi-
fies a criminal shortly after an incident but 
cannot later testify at trial that the accused is 
the previously identified criminal. Under such 
circumstances it is incumbent upon the prosecu-
tion to call as a witness a third party observer 
to the original identification to testify that the 
person identified by the victim at the former 
proceeding is in fact the accused. The second 
sentence of rule 32113 allows for the introduc-
tion of such testimony, but contrary positions 
can be taken as to how this provision should be 
interpreted. One view is that linkage between 
a pretrial identification and the accused can be 
established by simply presenting the testimony 
of a third party observer to the pre-trial iden-
tification. The clear language of the rule and 
abundant judicial authority supports this posi-
